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RELEASED TIME AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: A REPLY 
Leo Pfeffer* 
IN his generous article-review of this writer's book, Church, State, and Freedom, Paul G. Kauper justified the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Zorach v. Clauson2 on the basis of its prior 
decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.3 In the Pierce case, it will be 
remembered, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon statute whose 
purpose it was to require attendance of all children at public schools. 
In Zorach v. Clauson, the Court upheld the validity of a New York 
statute that permitted public schools to release children for one hour 
weekly to receive religious education in church schools off public 
school premises.4 Professor Kauper argues that" ... if release from all 
classes in the public schools is constitutionally required in order to 
protect the freedom of parents who wish to send their children to 
parochial schools, why does release for one hour per week from public 
school instruction in order to provide opportunity for religious education 
assume such extraordinary proportions as a form of coercion as to re-
quire its invalidation in the name of separation of church and state?"5 
This argument was presented by counsel for the appellees in the 
Zorach case. Although not adopted by the Supreme Court, it has won 
favor in the New York Court of Appeals6 and with a number of com-
mentators besides Professor Kauper. A writer in the Harvard Law 
"'Member, New York Bar; Counsel, American Jewish Congress.-Ed. 
1 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 MICH. L. R:Bv. 829 (1954). 
2 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). 
s 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925). 
4 In McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948), the Court 
held unconstitutional a released time program in Champaign, Illinois, whereunder the 
religious instruction was conducted within the public school building with substantial 
cooperation and supervision by public school authorities. Professor Kauper states that "All 
students of this subject may well agree that Zorach for all practical purposes overruled 
McCollum." Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review,'' 52 MicH. L. R:Bv. 829 
at 839 (1954). But the Court in Zorach distinguished McCollum on the ground that in 
the New York case "the public schools do no more than accommodate their schedules to a 
program of outside religious instruction." 343 U.S. 306 at 315, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). The 
Court expressly stated: "We follow the McCollum case. But we cannot expand it to cover 
the present released time program. • • ." Ibid. 
5 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review,'' 52 MICH. L. R:Bv. 829 at 841 
(1954). 
6Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161 at 173-174, 100 N.E. (2d) 463 (1951): ''More-
over, parents have the right to educate their children elsewhere than in the public schools, 
provided the State's minimum requirements are met (Education Law, §3204; Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, supra), and thus, if they wish, choose a religious or parochial school 
where religious instruction is freely given. That being so, it follows that parents, who 
desire to have their children educated in the public schools but to withdraw them therefrom 
for the limited period of only one hour a week in order to receive religious instruction, 
may ask the public school for such permission, and the school may constitutionally accede 
to this parental request. •.• " 
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Review, for example, asserts, "Since a state must release children com-
pletely from their obligation to attend public schools if they desire to 
attend religious schools [citing the Pierce case] it is at least arguable 
that it should be constitutionally permissible for the state to release 
them for one hour a week for the same purpose .... "7 
This may be called the Euclidean argument: the whole is greater 
than any of its parts and if a full school week of religious instruction 
can constitutionally pass through or over the wall of separation, a 
fortiori, one school hour can. It assumes another premise suggested by 
Professor Kauper8 and accepted by many commentators9 that the 
separation or "establishment" clause in the First Amendment:1° is not 
an absolute but merely a means to an end-the "free exercise" guaranty. 
When, as in a released time situation, effectuation of the separation 
principle would hinder rather than promote free exercise, the former 
must yield to the latter.11 
If the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is, Supreme 
Court decisions are what constitutional writers say they are. The 
Pierce case is treated by writers as an important decision in the consti-
tutional law of religious liberty12 and, viewed in the light of later cita-
tions of it by the Supreme Court,13 this is today a reasonable treatment 
of the decision. But when the Pierce case was decided, the liberty 
involved was not religious liberty at all. The issue was not whether the 
state could force upon a child a secular education offensive to his 
parents' religious convictions, but rather whether the state could con-
stitutionally arrogate to itself a monopoly in furnishing secular educa-
tion. "No question," said the Court, "is raised concerning the power 
of the State . . . to require that all children of proper age attend some 
school ... [or] that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship 
7 "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term," 66 HARv. L. RBv. 89 at 119 (1952). 
8 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 MICH. L. R.Bv. 829 at 841, 
844 (1954). 
9 E.g., Katz, "Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality," 20 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 426 
at 428 (1953); Murray, "Law or Prepossessions?" 14 I.Aw & CoNTEM. PnoB. 23 at 32 
(1949); CORWIN, A CoNSTITtlnON OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 114 (1951). 
10 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof." 
11 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 MxcH. L. R.Bv. 829 at 841 
(1954). 
12 Professor Howe, for example, includes it in his CASES ON CmmcH AND STATE IN 
THE UNITI!D STATES (1952). It is also included in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS ON FREEDOM 
IN RELIGION (1949). See also PFEFFER, CmmCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 513 (1953); 
Fahy, ''Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court," 14 I.Aw & CoNTEM. PnoB. 73 at 
74-76 (1949). 
18 E.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 
778 (1938); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. l at 32-33, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947) 
(dissent). 
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must be taught. . . ."14 And in Everson v. Board of Education, the 
Court upheld expenditure of public funds to transport children to paro-
chial schools because the state recognized that such schools supplied 
the children with the same secular education that the state was em-
powered to supply in its schools.15 
The year before the Zorach case was decided, the Supreme Court 
found lacking of sufficient merit to warrant argument, a contention 
that, to borrow the language of the Harvard Law Review writer,16 "a 
state must release children completely from their obligation to attend 
public schools if they desire to attend religious schools .... "17 But the 
conclusive evidence that the Pierce case was not based on religious 
liberty lies in the identity of the appellants. What is commonly re-
ferred to as the Pierce case involved two separate cases18 concerning 
two separate plaintiffs and two separate schools. One was the Catholic 
parochial school conducted by the Society of the Sisters of the Holy 
Names of Jesus and Mary. The other school was the Hill Military 
Academy in which, as far as the record shows, not even a Lord's Prayer 
was recited. Since a single opinion was written in both cases and no 
distinction was made in the opinion in respect to the two schools, it is 
clear that the liberty vindicated by the Supreme Court was not religious 
liberty.19 
14 268 U.S. 510 at 534, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925). 
15 330 U.S. 1 at 18, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947): "This Court has said that parents may, in 
the discharge of their duty under state compulsory education laws, send their children to a 
religious rather than a public school if the school meets the secular educational requirements 
which the state has power to impose. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. It 
appears that these parochial schools meet New Jersey's requirements." 
16 "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term," 66 HARv. L. RBv. 89 at 119 (1952). 
17Donner v. New York, 342 U.S. 884, 72 S.Ct. 178 (1951), dismissing for want of 
a substantial federal question, People v. Donner, 199 N.Y. Misc. 643, affd. 278 App. Div. 
705, affd. 302 N.Y. 857. The New York courts upheld a conviction under the state's com-
pulsory school attendance law of extremely Orthodox Jewish parents who insisted that their 
religious convictions precluded participation in secular education and who accordingly sent 
their children to an all-day school where only religion was studied. 
18 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Pierce v. Hill Military Academy. 
19 A similar fate was experienced by West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943), which is generally treated as a religious liberty 
decision [See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 at 165-166, 64 S.Ct. 438 
(1944)], although Justice Jackson took pains to point out that the issue was not whether 
Jehovah's Witnesses had a constitutional right to be exempted from the requirement of 
saluting the flag because their religious convictions forbade their participation in the cere-
mony, but whether the state could make the flag salute compulsory as to anyone. The issue, 
Justice Jackson said, was one of freedom of speech (which includes freedom to remain 
silent), not freedom of religion. The fact that the objectants were religiously motivated 
was immaterial, and the result would have been the same if the objectants had been atheists 
or agnostics. So, too, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358 (1905), is 
treated as a religious liberty case (e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 at 166, n. 
12), even though no assertion was made in that case that the compulsory vaccination law 
violated any religious convictions of the defendant, and the question of religion does not 
appear anywhere in the Court's decision upholding the statute against the claim that it 
violated the due process clause. 
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This discussion of the Pierce case shows the fallacy of the Eucliclean 
argument. The axiom that the whole is greater than any of its parts 
assumes that a particular part measured against the whole is part of 
that whole and not another whole. The whole in Pierce was twenty-
five hours of secular education; the part in Zorach was one hour of 
religious education. If in the Pierce case only Hill Military Academy 
had appealed to the Supreme Court, the decision and opinion would 
have been the same; yet it would be difficult to argue that because a 
child had a right to be released twenty-five hours weekly for education · 
at that institution, a release of one hour weekly for religious education 
was not constitutionally vulnerable. 
Professor Kauper is aware that the holding of the Pierce case is not 
completely applicable to the Zorach situation. He concedes that public 
school boards are not "under a constitutional compulsion to enter into 
released time arrangements." But the Pierce case left no discretion to 
school boards; it ruled that they were under a compulsion to allow 
children to attend parochial and other non-public schools.20 
Professor Kauper asserts that "It is not merely fanciful or frivolous 
to suggest that the parochial school system represents one hundred per-
cent released time."21 But this assertion is negated by the presence of 
the Hill Military Academy in the Pierce case. It is negated by the 
Everson case.22 It is negated by the Court's dismissal of the appeal in 
Donner v. New York.23 And it is negated by Professor Kauper's dis-
claimer of any intent to assert that "school boards are under a constitu-
tional compulsion to enter into released time arrangements." It requires 
little imagination to contemplate the effects upon public school admin-
istration if the Pierce doctrine were held applicable to all requests for 
time off for religious education from one to twenty-five hours weekly. 
Another religious liberty argument is suggested by Professor Kauper 
in support of the Zorach decision. "The author contends [says Professor 
Kauper] and rightly so, that public schools should be allowed to release 
children on certain days in order to attend special religious services of 
their faiths. This practice he defends on the grounds of religious lib-
20 For a similar criticism of the Court's assertion in the Everson case that it did "not 
mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation only to children attending 
public schools .••• " [330 U.S. l at 16, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947)], see PFEFFER, CmmCH, 
STATE, AND FREEDOM 477-478 (1953). 
21 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 M:rca. L. REv~ 829 at 841 
(1954). 
22 Justice Jackson's dissent in the Everson case was based on his contention that all 
the education received in Catholic parochial schools was religious. But this contention was 
rejected by the majority of the Court which held that the purpose of the assailed expendi-
ture of public funds was to "facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular educa-
tion .••. " 330 U.S. l at 7, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947). . 
23 Supra note 16. 
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erty and he states a good case. But is this not another instance of release 
time but on a smaller scale?"24 
This argument too was presented by counsel for the appellees in 
the Zorach case; but, unlike the Pierce argument, it achieved some 
acceptance by the Court which said: 
" ... A Catholic student applies to his teacher for permission to 
leave the school during hours on a Holy Day of Obligation to 
attend a mass. A Jewish student asks his teacher for permission 
to be excused for Yorn Kippur. A Protestant wants the afternoon 
off for a family baptismal ceremony. In each case the teacher 
requires parental consent in writing. In each case the teacher, in 
order to make sure the student is not a truant, goes further and 
requires a report from the priest, the rabbi, or the minister. The 
teacher in other words cooperates in a religious program to the 
extent of making it possible for her students to participate in it. 
Whether she does it occasionally for a few students, regularly for 
one, or pursuant to a systematized program designed to further the 
religious needs of all the students does not alter the character of 
the act."25 
This ''Yorn Kippur" argument too has a Euclidean base in the axiom 
that things equal to the same or equal things are equal to each other. 
It might be put in terms of an algebraic equation something like this 





The fallacy of this reasoning may be shown, as in the other Eu-
clidean argument, by applying the converse of the second Euclidean 
axiom: things equal to unqual things are unequal to each other. The 
"C" in the first equation means constitutionally required; the "C" in 
the third equation means constitutionally permitted and not (Professor 
Kauper agrees) constitutionally required. Thus testing the equation, 
we find: 
24 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 M:rCH. L. REv. 829 at 840 
(1954). 
25Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 at 313, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). The New York 
Court of Appeals expressed the argument thus: " ••• Excuses from attendance are permitted 
for many good reasons; among others, children are excused from school on holy days set 
apart by their respective faiths .••. Indeed we are all agreed that refusal to excuse children 
for that reason would be an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of religion. H it be 
constitutional to excuse children of a particular faith for entire days for such a religious 
purpose, it seems clear, by a parity of reasoning, that it is also constitutional, under the 
circumstances here presented, to excuse children of whatever faith one hour a week for 
another and similar religious purpose •••• " 303 N.Y. 161 at 173, 100 N.E. (2d) 463 (1951). 
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A Jewish child has a constitutional right to be excused from attend-
ing school on Yorn Kippur because it would violate his religious con-
victions to attend_ school on that day and his absence presents no threat 
to a higher societal interest sufficiently immediate and grave to justify 
impairment of the free exercise of his religion.26 No one, as far as this 
writer knows, has ever contended that it would violate the religious 
convictions of anyone to partake of religious education on Wednesdays 
between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon after the close of school rather 
than from 2 to 3 before school closes. If the Jewish religion permitted 
its adherents to observe Yam Kippur on Sunday or weekdays at their 
election, it is far from certain that Jewish children would have a con-
stitutional right to be excused from public school on a weekday to 
observe Yorn Kippur. The obligations of the state and the religious 
group are equal and reciprocal. If the former is obligated to achieve 
its purposes by means which do not infringe upon the rights guaran-
teed by the First Amendment if such alternative means are available 
and practicable,27 there would seem to be a reciprocal duty on the part 
of the individual to satisfy his religious requirements without infringing 
upon the state's functions if that is practicable. 
There is, this writer believes, a religious liberty claim in the released 
time program and in the Zorach case. It is a claim which is consistent 
with rather than opposed to the separation claim. In the appellants' 
brief to the Supreme Court in the Zorach case, this writer contended 
that the released time program violated the free exercise no less than 
the establishment guaranty of the First Amendment. The contention 
was based on the argument that the state's compulsory school attend-
ance laws operated to coerce children into participating in released time 
classes. Even if, as is sometimes suggested, the free exercise clause 
protects only the religious, 28 practical considerations frequently make 
26 Donner v. New York, 342 U.S. 884, 72 S.Ct. 178 (1951), makes it clear that 
religious convictions would not constitutionally require excused absences for 365 Yom Kippurs 
annually. Indeed, 52 Yom Kippurs a year may be too much. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bey, 
166 Pa. Super. 136 (1950), where the court overruled a Moslem parent's plea of religious 
liberty in a prosecution under the compulsory school attendance law for keeping his child 
away from school every Friday. 
27 Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct 308 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct 312 
(1951). 
28See, e.g., PARSONS, THE FmsT FRilllDOM 79 (1948): "As for those who profess no 
religion, or who repudiate religion, it is difficult to conceive how they can appeal to the 
First Amendment, since this document was solely concerned with religion itself, not its 
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it impossible to provide released time instruction for children adhering 
to minority denominations,29 with the result that these children are 
faced with the alternative of continued confinement in public school 
(pursuant to the compulsory school attendance law) or participation in 
instruction in a faith not their own.30 
This argument was disposed of by Justice Douglas for the majority 
of the Court in the Zorach case with a summary, "It takes obtuse reason-
ing to inject any issue of the 'free exercise' of religion into the present 
case."31 Professor Kauper is more charitable, but likewise rejects the 
argument. To him the fact that "the overwhelming majority of children 
continue to choose secular instruction .•. hardly supports the compul-
sion theory."32 (Professor Kauper's argument is somewhat reminiscent 
of the suggestion by Arthur Krock of the New York Times that even 
if Senator McCarthy's investigations of James Wechsler, editor of the 
New York Post, was motivated by a desire to intimidate him and thus 
affect the paper's editorial policy, it did not constitute an infringement 
of the First Amendment's guaranty of the freedom of the press because 
in fact Wechsler was not intimidated.) 
It is true that released time religious instruction has proved largely 
ineffective to attract public school children. 88 But the fact that most 
children find continued secular instruction less distasteful than religious 
instruction, while possibly a reflection upon religious pedagogical meth-
ods as compared with modern public school education, does not estab-
lish the absence of a restraint upon liberty nor remove the unconstitu-
tional taint. Constitutionally proscribed conduct does not become per-
missible because it is inefficacious. 
The writer has come across instances of criminal court judges sus-
pending prisoners' sentences and warning the prisoners that the sus-
denial. By its very nature, as regards what it says about religion, they are outside its ken." 
See also statement in Gordon v. Board 0£ Education, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 464, 178 P. (2d) 
488 (1947), quoted in Zorach v. Clauson, 198 N.Y. Misc. 631 (1950), to the effect that 
the purpose 0£ the amendment is to protect "freedom of religion, not freedom from 
religion." 
29 In the McCollum case, for example, there were no released time classes acceptable 
either to Lutherans or Jehovah's Witnesses, nor, except briefly when the program was 
launched, to Jewish children. See Transcript 0£ Record in McCollum v. Board 0£ Educa-
tion, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948). 
so PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 304 (1953). 
s1 343 U.S. 306 at 311, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). 
S2 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 MicH. L. REv. 829 at 840 
(1954). 
33 In McCollum, Justice Frankfurter quoted an estimate that 2,000,000 children par-
ticipated in released time programs. 333 U.S. 203 at 224-225, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948). This 
writer considers the estimate more than generous. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND Frum-
DOM 319-320 (1953). The 1950 Statistical Abstract 0£ the United States estimated that 
in 1947 there were 23,659,158 pupils enrolled in the nation's public schools. 
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pension would be revoked if they did not attend church services regu-
larly every Sunday. Can it be fairly said that church attendance under 
these circumstances is truly voluntary? 
The element of constraint in the released time program can be 
brought into sharper focus by viewing the compulsory school attend-
ance and the released laws as parts of a single statute. Present law 
( either expressly or by regulation or practice) requires children to attend 
public school, let us say, twenty-five hours weekly. A separate law 
permits children attending religious instruction to be excused for one 
of those hours. Suppose, however, the law required children to attend 
public school twenty-four hours weekly, except that children who do 
not participate in religious instruction are required to attend public 
school an additional and independent hour weekly, absence wherefrom 
subjects the child's parents to criminal prosecution. Would not attend-
ance at religious instruction be compulsive, and would the fact that 
nine out of ten children choose the extra hour of public school make it 
any less compulsive? 
The promoters of released time religious instruction are under no 
illusions. They recognize that even the small measure of success at-
tained by the program would be gravely threatened if the element of 
constraint were eliminated. It is for that reason that they reject every 
suggestion that children not choosing to attend religious instruction be 
permitted to go home. 
The present writer believes that the released time program contains 
within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. With the steady improve-
ment in the training of public school teachers and of educational meth-
ods, public school education is becoming increasingly attractive to chil-
dren. More and more, children actually want to go to school, and 
more and more they will prefer to remain in school than go to the 
church for the weekly hour of religious instruction. When religious 
education likewise improves in teaching personnel and practice so that 
it becomes so attracti~e as to constitute a real competitor of public school 
education, it will be found that encroachment upon public school time 
will not be necessary and that children will be willing to visit the church 
school for religious instruction after public school hours. 34 Then re-
ligious education will be truly voluntary, and the religious liberty issue 
truly absent. 
34 There is substantial evidence that religious educators are becoming increasingly 
aware of this, and that adoption of modem teaching methods, improved training and 
standards of teachers and better school facilities have effected substantial increases in 
attendance at religious schools without recourse to the released time plan. See, e.g., Pilch, 
"The Status of Jewish Education,'' 21 CoNGREss WEEKLY, No. 12, p. 1 (March 22, 1954). 
